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#FIRED: THE NATIONAL LABOR 
RELATIONS ACT AND EMPLOYEE 
OUTBURSTS IN THE AGE  
OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
Abstract: The National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) has long protected em-
ployees’ rights to engage in “concerted activity” for their mutual aid or protec-
tion. Enacted in 1935, the NLRA could not have foreseen the twenty-first century 
collision between employment law and social media. When evaluating social 
media cases, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) has had difficulty 
determining when an employee’s social media post is an individual complaint or 
a protected concerted activity. This Note examines the NLRA and its protection 
of employees who have faced employment consequences for their social media 
activities. It argues that the NLRB should modify its approach in social media 
cases to account for the intent of the employee and the public nature of a social 
media post. 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a time before the advent of social media websites.1 An emergen-
cy medical responder has had a long day. Multiple calls, difficult patients, piles 
of paperwork, and an uncompromising boss have driven her to her wit’s end. 
She arrives home and shouts to no one in particular, “Leave it to my company 
to hire a mental patient as a supervisor!” Assuming that the remarks are some-
how overheard, the law provides no protection for the medical responder, and 
she could face discipline from her employer. More likely, however, the words 
spoken in the privacy of her home go unheard. The medical responder calms 
down, goes to sleep, and uneventfully returns to work in the morning. 
Fast forward to today. That same employee has had the same terrible day. 
After meeting with her supervisor, she goes home and makes the same excla-
mation. This time, however, the statement is made on Facebook, and by click-
ing “post” the employee publishes her remarks for her social network to view. 
Now, friends and coworkers can view the post, and some might even respond 
and express their own frustration. The message spreads through the employee’s 
social network and beyond, eventually landing on the desk of her supervisor. 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Advice Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Div. of Advice, Office 
of the Gen. Counsel, Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., to Jonathan B. Kreisberg, Reg’l Dir., Region 34, 
Office of the Gen. Counsel, Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. 3 (Oct. 5, 2010), available at http://apps.nlrb.
gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458055b9c4, archived at http://perma.cc/MM5T-UTKU. The follow-
ing is a hypothetical based on this memorandum. See id. 
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After the supervisor becomes aware of the comment thread, she fires the em-
ployee.2 
The explosion of social media in the early 2000s has led to an unavoida-
ble collision with labor and employment law.3 Facebook, founded in 2004 by 
Mark Zuckerberg, is one of the most popular social media platforms.4 Face-
book allows users to find and connect with “friends” by typing their infor-
mation in a search bar and requesting an online friendship.5 Friends can then 
keep in contact by posting comments, videos, or pictures on each other’s pro-
file page.6 Facebook, along with other similar social media sites,7 not only 
shares these posts among friends and other users, but also maintains them, 
providing a record of comments and conversations.8 
                                                                                                                           
 2 See id. at 3–4. In each scenario of this hypothetical, the employee voiced work frustrations in 
the privacy of her own home. See id. One of these exclamations likely has no consequences, while the 
social media post leads to the employee’s termination. See id.  
 3 See Dorothy M. Bollinger, Social Media and Employment Law: A Practitioner’s Primer, 20 
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 323, 325 (2011) (articulating the rights of employees to use social 
media and the rights of employers to protect their businesses conflict); Natalie J. Ferrall, Note, Con-
certed Activity and Social Media: Why Facebook Is Nothing Like the Proverbial Water Cooler, 40 
PEPP. L. REV. 1001, 1003 (2013) (“All this living on the Internet raises a myriad of issues in the em-
ployment context.”). See generally OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., 
OM 12-31, REPORT OF THE ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES (Jan. 
24, 2012) [hereinafter NLRB MEMO OM 12-31], available at http://apps.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/
09031d45807d6567, archived at http://perma.cc/AN5Q-BC3S (discussing a variety of cases in which 
employees were fired for their social media activity).  
 4 See Company Info, FACEBOOK, https://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/, archived at https://
perma.cc/9CDX-RUXW (last visited Apr. 7, 2015). As of December 2014, the site has 1.39 billion 
active monthly users and 890 million daily users. Id. 
 5 Finding Friends, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/336320879782850/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/7EMN-LDWB (last visited Apr. 7, 2015). 
 6 How to Post & Share, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/333140160100643/, archived 
at http://perma.cc/HLR5-G2LJ (last visited Apr. 7, 2015). 
 7 Getting Started with Twitter, TWITTER, http://support.twitter.com/articles/215585-getting-
started-with-twitter, archived at http://perma.cc/QL24-DJGL (last visited Apr. 7, 2015) (explaining 
that Twitter is an information network that allows users to “follow” other users and access their 
“tweets”); Learn More, GOOGLE+, https://www.google.com/+/learnmore/, archived at https://perma.
cc/4AG3-2MQA (last visited Apr. 7, 2015) (explaining that Google+ allows users to connect in “cir-
cles” and “hangouts” where they can share photos, videos, and messages, among other features); What 
Is LinkedIn?, LINKEDIN, http://www.linkedin.com/static?key=what_is_linkedin, archived at http://
perma.cc/B3TN-4A4K (last visited Apr. 7, 2015) (explaining that LinkedIn is an online professional 
network that allows over 300 million users to build an online profile and connect with colleagues, 
friends, or employers). 
 8 How to Post & Share, supra note 6; see Ferrall, supra note 3, at 1029 (stating that social media 
activity is permanent because it is archived on profile pages); Ariana C. Green, Note, Using Social 
Networking to Discuss Work: NLRB Protection for Derogatory Employee Speech and Concerted 
Activity, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 837, 837 (2012) (stating that users share, complain, and respond to 
each other on social media sites). 
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The prevalence of social media and the archived record of these posts 
have created a number of legal issues in the employment context.9 Employers 
are put in a particularly difficult position of having to balance the positive and 
negative impacts that social media might have on their companies.10 For ex-
ample, many employers utilize social networking sites to locate and recruit 
new employees.11 Social media has also promoted innovative marketing strat-
egies that allow employers to directly reach prospective consumers, unlike tra-
ditional print advertising.12  
With this innovation, however, comes increased exposure to liability for 
employers, whose frustrated employees may now use social media to voice 
work complaints.13 Social media’s massive personal and professional networks 
connect coworkers whose online communications distinctly affect employers, 
unlike ordinary private communications and complaints.14 These archived so-
                                                                                                                           
 9 See NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 2 (explaining the prevalence of employment dis-
putes arising from social media activity); Erin Allen, Update on the Twitter Archive at the Library of 
Congress, LIBRARY OF CONG. BLOG (Jan. 4, 2013), http://blogs.loc.gov/loc/2013/01/update-on-the-
twitter-archive-at-the-library-of-congress/, archived at http://perma.cc/52LR-F36W. In 2010, Twitter 
agreed to provide the Library of Congress with all public tweets ever posted. Id. Under the agreement, 
Twitter also agreed to provide all future public tweets to the Library of Congress. Id. As of January 
2013, the Library of Congress had an archive of over 170 billion tweets and considers the recording of 
social media posts to be part of their mission to “collect the story of America.” Id. 
 10 Peter J. Pizzi, Where Cyber and Employment Law Intersect, Risks for Management Abound, in 
UNDERSTANDING DEVELOPMENTS IN CYBERSPACE LAW: LEADING LAWYERS EXAMINING PRIVACY 
ISSUES, ADDRESSING SECURITY CONCERNS, AND RESPONDING TO RECENT IT TRENDS 29, 29 (Sandra 
A. Jeskie et al. eds. 2011) (stating that social media is both beneficial and problematic for employers). 
Compare DAVID MEERMAN SCOTT, THE NEW RULES OF MARKETING & PR: HOW TO USE SOCIAL 
MEDIA, BLOGS, NEWS RELEASES, ONLINE VIDEO, AND VIRAL MARKETING TO REACH BUYERS DI-
RECTLY 231 (2d ed. 2009) (explaining how Facebook has created marketing opportunities for busi-
nesses that can now reach customers through social media), with Nicky Woolf, Coca-Cola Pulls Twit-
ter Campaign After It Was Tricked into Quoting Mein Kampf, GUARDIAN (Feb. 15, 2015, 10:58 AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/feb/05/coca-cola-makeithappy-gakwer-mein-coke-hitler, 
archived at http://perma.cc/X2B9-UYN3 (explaining how Coca-Cola’s marketing campaign on Twit-
ter was manipulated to make Coca-Cola tweet large portions of Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf). 
 11 See Ferrall, supra note 3, at 1003 (explaining that a majority of companies use social media to find 
and recruit talent). Online networking sites like LinkedIn allow employers and employees to connect 
through an online professional network. What is LinkedIn?, supra note 7. 
 12 See SCOTT, supra note 10, at 231 (explaining how Facebook’s decision to make accounts avail-
able to non-students has created opportunities for businesses to use the site as a marketing tool); Jeff 
Elder, Social Media Fail to Live Up to Early Marketing Hype, WALL ST. J. (Jun. 23, 2014), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/companies-alter-social-media-strategies-1403499658, archived at http://perma.
cc/CMB8-PXKT (describing how companies have altered their social media marketing strategies to 
target quality connections with consumers instead of trying to get a greater quantity of followers). 
 13 Pizzi, supra note 10, at 29 (explaining that employees’ online complaints may expose employ-
ers to liability). See generally NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3 (explaining cases where employ-
ees voiced work complaints on social media). 
 14 See Pizzi, supra note 10, at 29; see also Jessica Durando, Young Woman Fired over Twitter 
Before Starting Job, USA TODAY (Feb. 10, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-
now/2015/02/10/twitter-texas-boss-fired-employee/23180071/, archived at http://perma.cc/R7QJ-
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cial media communications expose employers to the possibility of defamation 
claims, improper disclosure of confidential information, and damage to the 
employer’s reputation.15 With this exposure in mind, some employers have 
responded to these online communications by terminating employees, impli-
cating the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) and its protection of con-
certed activity.16 
This Note argues that employee intent should be the standard for deter-
mining whether social media posts constitute concerted activity under the 
NLRA.17 Part I explains the statutory framework for concerted activity and the 
National Labor Relation Board’s (“NLRB”) interpretation of concerted activi-
ty.18 Part II then discusses how the NLRB has applied the concerted activity 
standard to social media cases. 19 Part III argues that the concerted activity 
standard creates inconsistencies when applied to social media cases and that 
the NLRB should alter its interpretation of the standard to account for the reali-
ties of the online world.20 Part III suggests that in defining concerted activity in 
social media cases, the NLRB and courts should consider employee intent ra-
ther than the unpredictable responses online.21 Part III also suggests that the 
NLRB should apply a modified test that considers the public nature of social 
media posts when determining whether an employee’s comments should lose 
the protection of the NLRA.22 
I. CONCERTED ACTIVITY: STATUTORY FRAMEWORK AND  
THE NLRB’S INTERPRETATION 
The NLRB and courts have developed a standard for determining what 
type of employee behavior constitutes concerted activity.23 This Part explains 
the concerted activity standard and how it has been applied to social media 
cases.24 Section A introduces the statutory framework of the NLRA and the 
                                                                                                                           
TDAQ (reporting that a woman was fired before starting work at pizza parlor for tweeting: “Ew I start 
this (expletive) job tomorrow”). 
 15 See Pizzi, supra note 10, at 29. 
 16 See NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 2 (describing cases where employees were fired 
for their social media activity); see also National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012); 
id. § 157 (granting employees right to engage in concerted activities for their mutual aid or protec-
tion). 
17 See infra notes 155–240 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 23–92 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 93–154 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 155–240 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 210–222 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 223–240 and accompanying text. 
23 See generally NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3 (applying the concerted activity analysis 
to new cases arising in social media contexts). 
24 See infra notes 27–92 and accompanying text. 
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relevant statutory language pertaining to concerted activities.25 Section B then 
explains the NLRB’s interpretation of concerted activities by highlighting sev-
eral landmark cases that predate the emergence of social media.26  
A. Concerted Activity: Section 7 and Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA 
In 1935, Congress enacted the NLRA to promote labor peace and protect 
employees from unfair labor practices that harm the general welfare of workers 
and the economy.27 After some early amendments, the text of the NLRA has 
remained largely unchanged.28 One important part of the NLRA is section 7, 
which protects employees’ right to formally organize into unions.29 Additional-
ly, section 7 protects employees’ rights “to engage in other concerted activities 
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection 
. . . .”30 Section 8(a)(1) makes it an unlawful labor practice for an employer to 
interfere with these concerted activities.31 Thus, employees who engage in 
concerted activities are protected from retaliatory employment action.32 
Although the language protecting concerted activity has been included in 
the NLRA since 1935, the NLRB has only recently applied it to employee pro-
                                                                                                                           
 25 See infra notes 27–38 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 39–92 and accompanying text. 
 27 National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended 
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012)). Specifically, the NLRA declares that its policy is to protect workers 
“by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by 
workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives . . . for the 
purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.” 
Id. § 151. The NLRB and its General Counsel enforce the NLRA. Id. § 153; see also What We Do, 
NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do, archived at http://perma.cc/36QH-T8PT (last visited Apr. 7, 
2015). The General Counsel and their regional offices are responsible for the investigation and prosecu-
tion of unfair labor practices that are brought before the NLRB and its Administrative Law Judges for 
adjudication. Who We Are, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are, archived at http://perma.cc/
S638-D5VK (last visited Apr. 7, 2015). Moreover, it is the General Counsel and the NLRB who are 
responsible for effectuating the policies of the NLRA and, more generally, protecting national labor 
and employment policies. See NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957). 
 28 See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 
1532–33 (2002) (“The text has remained virtually untouched since 1959.”); Ferrall, supra note 3, at 
1007 (noting that the NLRA’s current version incorporates the original 1935 Act, with amendments 
from 1947 and 1959). 
 29 29 U.S.C. § 157 (“Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist 
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing . . . .”). 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. § 158. 
 32 See id. §§ 157, 158; Ferrall, supra note 3, at 1008 (explaining that employees engaged in con-
certed activities are protected against adverse employment actions by their employers). The most 
important employee protection under section 7 is that an employee may not be discharged for his or 
her concerted activities. Calvin William Sharpe, “By Any Means Necessary”—Unprotected Conduct 
and Decisional Discretion Under the National Labor Relations Act, 20 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
203, 206 (1999). 
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tection in online activity.33 The NLRA does not explicitly define concerted ac-
tivities, but does provide some insight as to the meaning of the term.34 The 
NLRA’s use of the word “other” in the phrase that protects “other concerted 
activities” suggests that the preceding activities—self-organization, joining a 
labor organization, and collectively bargaining—are concerted activities them-
selves.35 Congress’s inclusion of the “other concerted activities” language, 
however, implies that there are concerted activities, not enumerated in the stat-
ute, which warrant section 7 protection.36 The statutory language suggests that 
these other concerted activities are similar in nature to the activities specifical-
ly enumerated at the beginning of section 7.37 Nevertheless, without an express 
statutory definition, the NLRB and federal courts have had to grapple with the 
meaning of concerted activities.38 
B. Group Action and Exceptions: Landmark Cases and Their Influence on 
the NLRB’s Framework for Defining Concerted Activity 
The NLRB’s development of the concerted activity analysis provides the 
framework for analyzing employee activities in social media cases.39 The 
NLRB has stated that concerted activities are actions “engaged in with or on 
the authority of other employees” to advance group employee interests con-
cerning the terms and conditions of employment.40 The NLRB has clarified 
that individual employees who “seek to initiate or to induce or to prepare for 
                                                                                                                           
 33 See NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 2; Green, supra note 8, at 837. 
 34 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012); NLRB v. City Disposal Sys. Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 831 n.8 (1984) (“Sec-
tion 7 lists these and other activities initially and concludes the list with the phrase ‘other concerted 
activities,’ thereby indicating that the enumerated activities are deemed to be ‘concerted.’”); see Lau-
ren K. Neal, Note, The Virtual Water Cooler and the NLRB: Concerted Activity in the Age of Face-
book, 69 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1715, 1718 (2012) (explaining that “other” concerted activities are 
similar to those enumerated in section 7).  
 35 Rita Gail Smith & Richard A. Parr II, Protection of Individual Action as “Concerted Activity” 
Under the National Labor Relations Act, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 369, 377 (1983) (explaining that Con-
gress’s use of the word “other” suggests that concerted activities share characteristics with the enu-
merated protected activities in the statute); Neal, supra note 34, at 1718 (explaining that the placement 
of section 7’s “concerted activity” language sheds light on the meaning of the phrase). 
 36 See 29 U.S.C. § 157; Smith & Parr, supra note 35, at 377; Neal, supra note 34, at 1718. 
 37 See 29 U.S.C. § 157; Smith & Parr, supra note 35, at 377; Neal, supra note 34, at 1718. 
 38 See 29 U.S.C. § 157; Smith & Parr, supra note 35, at 377; Neal, supra note 34, at 1718. After 
the NLRB renders a final decision in a labor or employment case, any person aggrieved may seek 
appellate review in an appropriate U.S. appellate court. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f); Appellate Court Briefs and 
Motions, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/cases-decisions/appellate-court-briefs-and-motions, archived at 
http://perma.cc/32K3-UAQR (last visited Apr. 7, 2015). 
 39 See generally NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3 (applying the Meyers concerted activity 
analysis to new cases arising in social media contexts). 
 40 Meyers Indus., Inc. (Meyers I), 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 497 (1984). 
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group action” are protected under the concerted activities standard.41 On the 
other hand, employee’s activities are not concerted and will not receive the 
protection of the NLRA if they are engaged in “solely by and on behalf of the 
employee himself,” even if those actions are related to the terms and condi-
tions of employment.42 
Additionally, the NLRB and courts hold that employees might lose the 
protection of the NLRA if their conduct falls within one of three exceptions.43 
First, the activity must not be so inappropriate to be considered “opprobri-
ous.”44 This opprobrious determination hinges on the location and subject mat-
ter of the discussion, the nature of an employee’s outburst, and whether the 
outburst was, in any way, provoked by an employer’s unfair labor practice.45 
Second, employees’ concerted activity might fall outside the NLRA’s protec-
tion if they violate their duty of loyalty by publicly disparaging their employ-
er’s services.46 Third, “mere griping” without having an objective to take ac-
tion is not considered concerted activity.47 
The remainder of this Section explores how courts determine whether to 
classify employee conduct as concerted activity.48 First, Subsection 1 discusses 
how concerted activity requires group action to merit protection under the 
NLRA.49 Then, Subsection 2 details exceptions to the group action require-
ment and how employees can lose the NLRA’s protections.50 
1. The Meyers Cases and the NLRB’s Requirement of Group Action 
Between 1984 and 1987, the NLRB decided four related cases which de-
termined that an individual employee’s activity was protected under the NLRA 
                                                                                                                           
 41 See Meyers Indus., Inc. (Meyers II), 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 887 (1986). Meyers II also held that 
“individual employees bringing truly group complaints” to management are engaged in concerted 
activities. See id. 
 42 Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. at 497. 
 43 See NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers (Jefferson Standard), 346 
U.S. 464, 473 (1953); Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964); Atl. Steel 
Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816 (1979). 
 44 Atl. Steel, 245 N.L.R.B. at 816; Hawaiian Hauling Serv., Ltd., 219 N.L.R.B. 765, 766 (1975) 
(recognizing employees may engage in conduct “so opprobrious as to be unprotected”); see Care 
Initiatives, Inc., 321 N.L.R.B. 144, 151 (1996) (stating that behavior that could lose protection of the 
NLRA includes obscene language directed at supervisor, violent communications, or insulting person-
al attacks). 
 45 Atl. Steel, 245 N.L.R.B. at 816. 
 46 See Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. at 473, 476; see also Am. Golf Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 1238, 
1241 (2000) (finding that publically distributing a flyer that disparages employer’s products is beyond 
the protection of the NLRA). 
 47 See Mushroom Transp., 330 F.2d at 685. 
48 See infra notes 51–92 and accompanying text. 
49 See infra notes 51–63 and accompanying text. 
50 See infra notes 64–92 and accompanying text. 
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only if the activity was connected to other employees’ activities.51 This family 
of cases is collectively referred to as Meyers.52 In 1984, in Meyers Industries, 
Inc. (Meyers I), an employer terminated a truck driver employed to haul boats 
from the Meyers facility in Michigan to dealers around the country.53 When the 
employee had an accident in Tennessee caused by a brake failure, he called the 
Tennessee Public Service Commission, which found the vehicle unsafe for op-
eration and issued the employer a citation.54 After the employee refused to 
drive the truck back to the facility, Meyers terminated him.55 
The NLRB found that Meyers did not violate section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA 
when it discharged its employee for contacting state authorities and refusing to 
drive his truck after the accident.56 In its decision, the NLRB articulated a new 
definition of concerted activity, finding that an employee’s activity must be 
“engaged in with or on the authority of other employees, and not solely by and 
on behalf of the employee himself.”57 The court found that because the em-
ployee acted on his own behalf, section 7 did not protect him from adverse 
employment action.58 
The D.C. Circuit later affirmed the NLRB’s interpretation of concerted 
activity in Meyers.59 In 1987, in Meyers Industries, Inc. (Meyers II), the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia specifically endorsed the 
NLRB’s explanation that concerted activity includes individual employees 
seeking to “initiate or to induce or to prepare for group action,” as well as em-
                                                                                                                           
 51 Prill v. NLRB (Prill II), 835 F.2d 1481, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (affirming that an employee 
who acted alone by complaining to a supervisor was not engaged in concerted activity); Prill v. NLRB 
(Prill I), 755 F.2d 941, 957 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (remanding to the NLRB to reconsider the scope of con-
certed activities); Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. at 887 (finding that concerted activity requires employee to 
initiate, induce, or prepare for group action); Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. at 499 (finding that an employ-
ee’s individual activity was not concerted activity). 
 52 See Prill II, 835 F.2d at 1481; Prill I, 755 F.2d at 941; Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. at 887; Meyers 
I, 268 N.L.R.B. at 499; see also Ferrall, supra note 3, at 1010 (referring to these four cases collective-
ly as the “Meyers line of cases”).  
 53 268 N.L.R.B. at 497. The driver had been experiencing difficulty with the brakes and steering. Id. 
On a number of occasions, he made complaints to his employer concerning the malfunctions of this 
company owned truck. Id. The employer did not properly address the problem, as the driver’s brakes 
continued to malfunction, even after a company mechanic tried to fix the breaks. Id. 
 54 Id. The employee called the Tennessee Public Service Commission on his own volition and 
arranged for an official inspection. Id. After the accident, he first called his employer, who instructed 
him to take the truck to a mechanic and get it home to Michigan as soon as he could. Id. 
 55 Id. at 498. The driver’s employer specifically stated to him, “[W]e can’t have you calling the 
cops like this all the time.” Id. 
 56 Id. (finding that the employee was not engaged in concerted activity). 
 57 Id. at 497. The court held that the employee did not engage in the activity with or on behalf of 
other employees. Id. at 498. It acknowledged that another driver had driven the employee’s truck, and 
even that the employee had overheard this driver’s complaints about the malfunctioning brakes. Id. 
The court found, however, that these facts failed to establish that the employee had acted on anyone 
else’s behalf. Id. 
 58 See id. 
 59 Prill II, 835 F.2d at 1484. 
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ployees bringing group complaints to the attention of management.60 The 
court’s explanation drew a fine line for the concerted activity analysis, reason-
ing that the employee would have received the NLRA’s protection if he had 
simply gathered with his coworkers instead of acting on his own.61 The court’s 
reasoning, coupled with the NLRB’s explanation in Meyers I, suggested that a 
finding of concerted activity depends heavily on the facts of each situation.62 
Today, the NLRB’s decisions regarding concerted activity are still guided by 
the Meyers group activity standard.63 
2. Losing Protection of the NLRA Through Opprobrious Conduct, Public 
Disparagement, or Mere Griping 
Although the Meyers cases supply the general framework for the concert-
ed activity analysis, the NLRB has limited the scope of section 7’s concerted 
activity protections to employees.64 For example, in 1979, in Atlantic Steel 
Co., the NLRB found that an employee engaged in protected concerted activity 
would lose the protection of the NLRA through “opprobrious” conduct.65 In 
that case, an employee confronted a supervisor regarding the distribution of 
overtime hours.66 After an argument, the employee was suspended and eventu-
ally fired for insubordination.67 
Pursuant to the arbitrator’s conclusion, the NLRB determined that the 
employee had engaged in concerted activity by bringing a legitimate grievance 
to the foreman that concerned his fellow employees.68 Although this would 
ordinarily constitute concerted activity under the NLRA, the NLRB reasoned 
that the employee’s conduct was opprobrious because he had acted in an “ob-
scene fashion without provocation” and such conduct should not be tolerated 
                                                                                                                           
 60 See 281 N.L.R.B. at 887; see also Prill II, 835 F.2d at 1484. 
 61 Prill II, 835 F.2d at 1485. 
 62 Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. at 497 (“[T]he question of whether an employee engaged in concerted 
activity is, at its heart, a factual one, the fate of a particular case rising or falling on the record evi-
dence.”); see Prill II, 835 F.2d at 1485 (stating that the case hinged on the fact that the employee had 
not gathered with his coworkers to discuss his complaints). 
 63 See Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. at 497; NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 4–5 (explaining 
that the NLRB applies the Meyers standard when examining concerted activity). 
 64 See Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. at 476 (finding that an employee can lose protection of the 
NLRA by publicly disparaging the employer’s goods or services); Mushroom Transp., 330 F.2d at 
685 (finding that mere griping that does not look toward group action is not concerted activity); Atl. 
Steel, 245 N.L.R.B. at 816 (explaining that an employee may lose protection of the NLRA by engag-
ing in opprobrious conduct). 
 65 See 245 N.L.R.B. at 816. 
 66 Id. at 814. The employee was concerned that the supervisor had assigned overtime hours to a 
probationary employee, against the standard practice of assigning hours based on seniority. Id. 
 67 Id. The supervisor told the employee that all employees were working overtime, after which, 
according to witness testimony, the employee “called the foreman a ‘lying son of a bitch’ or stated that 
the foreman told a ‘m— f— lie’ (or was a ‘m— f— liar’).” Id. 
 68 See id. at 816–17. 
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in the workplace.69 In deciding when conduct qualifies as opprobrious and 
therefore loses the NLRA’s protection, the NLRB outlined four factors for con-
sideration: “(1) the place of the discussion; (2) the subject matter of the discus-
sion; (3) the nature of the employee’s outburst; and (4) whether the outburst 
was, in any way, provoked by an employer’s unfair labor practice.”70 The 
NLRB reasoned that allowing an offhand complaint to shield an employee 
from otherwise unacceptable conduct was not consistent with the purpose of 
the NLRA.71 
In addition to the Atlantic Steel opprobrious conduct exception, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has developed another exception for losing the NLRA’s protec-
tion based on principles of loyalty.72 In 1953, in NLRB v. Local Union No. 
1229, International Brotherhood of Electric Workers (“Jefferson Standard”), 
the Supreme Court held that protections for concerted activity do not obviate 
the duties of loyalty that exist between employers and employees.73 Moreover, 
the Court explained that protected concerted activity is separable from unpro-
tected activities that fall outside the purview of the NLRA’s protection.74 In 
Jefferson Standard, unionized employees of a broadcasting company began 
picketing outside their workplace after labor negotiations with their employer 
broke down.75 Several weeks later, a number of technicians printed handbills 
that “launched a vitriolic attack on the quality of the company’s television 
broadcasts.”76 The handbills were distributed among the picket line, on the 
public square located a few blocks from the employer’s premises, and in bar-
bershops, restaurants, and busses.77 The handbill distribution continued until 
                                                                                                                           
 69 Id. at 817. 
 70 See id. at 816. 
 71 Id. at 817. The NLRB does not go so far as to suggest that any sort of obscenity would consti-
tute opprobrious conduct. See id. Instead, the NLRB seemed to suggest that the location of the out-
burst in the workplace, during work hours, weighed heavily in the employer’s favor when balancing 
the four factors. See id.; cf. Thor Power Tool Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 1379, 1380 (1964) (finding that an 
employee’s use of an obscenity in a grievance meeting in his employer’s office was still protected 
under the NLRA). 
 72 See Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. at 473. The case is known as Jefferson Standard after the 
name of the employer engaged in the union dispute. See NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 24; 
Ferrall, supra note 3, at 1014. 
 73 See 346 U.S. at 473. 
 74 Id. at 476. 
 75 Id. at 467. The union picketed after work hours and focused their picketing on the company’s 
refusal to renew the arbitration provisions in their new employment agreement. Id. 
 76 Id. at 467–68. The technicians printed 5,000 handbills that made no reference to the union, the 
labor controversy, or to collective bargaining at all. Id. at 468. Instead, the handbills criticized the Jef-
ferson Standard Broadcasting Company’s television programs, negatively comparing the programs to 
those from companies in other major cities. Id. The technicians criticized the company for airing old 
programs, failing to show certain sporting events, and failing to provide any local programs. Id. The 
handbills concluded that that the Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Company must have considered Char-
lotte to be a second-class community. Id. 
 77 Id. at 468. 
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the company discharged the ten technicians responsible for the attack.78 The 
NLRB found that nine of the ten discharged employees had sponsored or dis-
tributed the handbill and upheld their termination.79 
On appeal, the Supreme Court found that the handbills were not related to 
the ongoing labor dispute, and that “[t]he fortuity of the coexistence of the la-
bor dispute” did not afford the technicians a defense.80 The Court found that 
the handbills were “a concerted separable attack” that deprived the technicians 
of the NLRA’s protection.81 Although it did not articulate an explicit standard 
for losing the NLRA’s protection, the Supreme Court focused on the public 
disparagement of the employer’s services and generally held that concerted 
activities are separable from non-protected activities and should not weaken 
the underlying loyalties of the employment relationship.82 
Finally, the third type of activity that does not fall within the NLRA’s pro-
tection is behavior that qualifies as an employee’s “mere griping.”83 In 1964, in 
Mushroom Transportation Co. v. NLRB, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit determined that if activity consists of only talking, the “talk” 
must look toward group action to warrant the NLRA protection’s.84 In that 
case, a part-time driver regularly talked with and advised other employees on 
their rights.85 When the company discovered this, it removed the driver from 
the “extra list” and gave him no further work.86 The NLRB found that these 
conversations and the employee’s activities in general were directly related to 
                                                                                                                           
 78 Id. 
 79 See id. at 475–76. 
 80 See id. at 476. 
 81 Id. at 477. The Court explained that reinstatement of the technicians responsible for the hand-
bills would contradict the purposes of the NLRA, namely fostering peaceful labor practices. Id. at 476. 
 82 See id. at 473, 476; see also Ferrall, supra note 3, at 1015–16 (explaining that the employees’ 
handbills attack was separable from the labor controversy, and that even if distribution of handbills 
was concerted activity, its disparaging nature barred employees from the NLRA’s protection). The 
Court focused on separable conduct, emphasizing the importance of balancing workplace loyalty with 
the right to engage in concerted activities. See Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. at 474–75, 477. In light of 
these loyalty concerns, the Court noted that it is equally important to enforce discharges for causes 
separate from concerted activity, as it is to protect those employees who are actually engaged in con-
certed activity. See id. at 474–75. The reasoning suggests that the NLRB should consider the duty of 
loyalty in determining whether conduct is separable from concerted activities and therefore whether 
that conduct should lose the NLRA’s protection. See id. at 473, 476. 
 83 See Mushroom Transp., 330 F.2d at 685 (internal quotations omitted). 
 84 Id. (“Activity which consists of mere talk must, in order to be protected, be talk looking toward 
group action.”). This suggests that a complaint is only concerted activity if it is actually intended to 
initiate group action. See id. 
 85 See id. at 684. The subject of these conversations typically focused on holiday pay, vacation 
time, and the company’s occasional practice of employing drivers from other companies for trips. 
 86 Id. at 685. A union contract protected jobs of regular drivers. Id. As an “extra man,” the em-
ployee was a non-regular driver for the company. See id. By removing him from the extra list, the 
company effectively terminated the employee. See id. 
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the terms and condition of employment.87 Thus, it determined that the driver’s 
conversations were protected as concerted activities.88 On appeal, however, the 
Third Circuit refused to enforce the NLRB’s order, holding that the driver’s 
conversations with other employees did not “initiate or promote any concerted 
action” that would actually improve the relevant conditions of employment.89 
Instead, the conversations were “mere griping” insufficient to trigger the 
NLRA’s protection.90 
In sum, the Meyers standard suggests that an individual employee’s activ-
ity is concerted, and thus protected by the NLRA, when the employee seeks to 
initiate or prepare for group action.91 Nevertheless, employee activity might 
not be protected by the NLRA if it falls within one of three exceptions: oppro-
brious conduct, separable public disparagement, or mere griping.92 
II. THE NLRB’S APPROACH TO CONCERTED ACTIVITY IN THE SOCIAL 
MEDIA CONTEXT: APPLYING OLD LAW TO NEW TECHNOLOGY 
On January 24, 2012, the National Labor Relations Board’s (“NLRB”) 
Office of the General Counsel issued Memorandum OM 12-31 (“NLRB Memo 
OM 12-31”), a report concerning the NLRB’s recent social media cases.93 The 
NLRB Memo OM 12-31 was intended to provide guidance on the NLRB’s 
approach to the concerted nature of employees’ social media postings.94 Spe-
cifically, NLRB Memo OM 12-31 detailed a number of cases in which the 
NLRB has applied the concerted activity framework to social media cases.95 In 
deciding these cases under the existing concerted activity framework, the 
NLRB has applied the old concerted activity standards to circumstances aris-
ing under new social media technology.96 
                                                                                                                           
 87 Id. at 684. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at 684–85. 
 90 Id. at 685 (internal quotations omitted). Critical to the court’s decision was the fact that the 
employees’ conversations never involved any effort to promote concerted action to actually do any-
thing about the matters discussed. See id. 684–85. The court explained that if it were to consider the 
employee’s conversations concerted activity, then “any conversation between employees comes with-
in the ambit of activities protected by the Act provided it relates to the interests of the employees.” Id. 
at 685. Here, the court established that a conversation’s relation to a legitimate interest of other em-
ployees is insufficient for a finding of concerted activity. See id. There must be an actual effort to 
initiate concerted action. See id. Otherwise, the discussions are “mere griping.” See id. (internal quota-
tions omitted). 
 91 Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. at 887. 
 92 See Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. at 477; Mushroom Transp., 330 F.2d at 685; Atl. Steel, 245 
N.L.R.B. at 816. 
 93 See NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 2 (applying the concerted activity analysis to 
new cases arising in social media contexts). 
 94 Id. 
 95 See id.  
 96 See id. 
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Although NLRB Memo OM 12-31 did not give specific case citations, it 
provided specific facts for each case and a detailed explanation of the NLRB’s 
analysis.97 This Part discusses the application of the concerted activity standard 
to these social media cases.98 Section A discusses Collections Agency and 
Trucking Co. to illustrate when the NLRB construes a social media post as 
constituting group activity.99 Section B then discusses Popcorn Packaging and 
Hospital to explain how the NLRB has applied exceptions to the group action 
requirement in social media cases.100 
A. Does Anybody Else Care?: Concerted Activity and Coworker Responses 
 In Collections Agency, the NLRB found that the employer unlawfully 
terminated an employee for a comment that she posted on her Facebook page, 
which initiated a group discussion about possible class action.101 Initially, the 
employee was transferred to a new position that effectively served as a demo-
tion.102 She approached her supervisor to discuss the transfer and to communi-
cate her frustration.103 After returning home, the employee made a work-
related, expletive-filled post to her Facebook page.104 The employee was Face-
book friends with numerous coworkers, many of whom commented on her 
post.105 The comments were specific responses to the employee’s post and con-
tained detailed references to the employment dispute.106 When the employee 
returned to work, the employer fired her, showing her a copy of her Facebook 
post and the subsequent comments on the post.107 
                                                                                                                           
97 See id. This Note refers to the cases as Collections Agency, Trucking Co., Popcorn Packaging, 
and Hospital. See id. at 3, 22, 26, 32; see also Ferrall, supra note 3, at 1022 (referring to the NLRB 
MEMO OM 12-31 cases by the descriptive names given in the memorandum). 
98 See infra notes 101–154 and accompanying text. 
99 See infra notes 101–123 and accompanying text. 
100 See infra notes 124–154 and accompanying text. 
 101 See Collections Agency, NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 3–4. 
 102 Id. at 3. The employee worked in the inbound calls group at one of the employer’s offices. Id. 
Her employer transferred her to outbound calls. Id. By way of the compensation setup, the inbound 
calls group was able to consistently earn more commission than the outbound group. Id. The employ-
ee had consistently ranked as a top performer in the inbound calls group. Id. 
 103 See id. 
 104 Id. Specifically, the employee stated that her employer had “messed up and that she was done 
with being a good employee.” Id. 
 105 Id. at 4. 
 106 See id. One coworker commented that she was angry and “right behind” the employee. Id. 
Another stated that only bad behavior was rewarded and that the employer was willing to replace 
higher-paid, smarter workers with cheap alternatives. Id. A former employee went so far as to call for 
filing a class action lawsuit, suggesting that there were enough disgruntled employees to form a class. 
See id. 
 107 Id. The employer explicitly told the employee that she was being fired due to her Facebook 
activity. Id. 
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Applying the Meyers group activity standard, the NLRB found that the 
employer had violated section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act 
(“NLRA”) because the employee’s post and her coworkers’ responses were 
concerted activity.108 The NLRB found that the responses to the employee’s 
post were related to working conditions and represented the frustrations of 
many coworkers about how the employer treated its employees.109 Based on 
the responses of the employee’s coworkers, the NLRB held that the discussion 
was an employee initiating group action, falling neatly into the definition of 
concerted group activity in Meyers.110 
Conversely, in Trucking Co., the NLRB found that an employee who had 
posted complaints on Facebook did not engage in concerted activity because 
no coworkers responded.111 The employee was a truck driver traveling across 
multiple states to make a delivery.112 When the employee arrived near his 
drop-off destination, he learned that roads were closed due to snow.113 He at-
tempted to reach the company’s on-call dispatcher several times, but was for-
warded to the office phone where there was also no answer.114 The employee 
spoke to other drivers and discussed his inability to reach the on-call dispatch-
er.115 He then posted a series of comments on his Facebook page, stating that 
roads were closed, that no one had answered his phone call, and that if any 
drivers were late with their deliveries, it would be the employer’s fault.116 He 
also complained that the employer would lose all of its experienced, hard-
working drivers.117 None of the employee’s coworkers responded to his 
post.118 The employee eventually resigned as a result of the incident.119 
                                                                                                                           
 108 See id. at 5. As concerted activity, the employee’s Facebook activity was protected by section 
7 of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). Her employer’s interference with those activities was found 
to be a violation of section 8(a)(1). Id. § 158. 
 109 See Collections Agency, NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 5. The particular comment 
that suggested filing a class action lawsuit seemed to make this a relatively easy case for the NLRB. 
See id. (emphasizing that “one former coworker suggested taking concerted activity through the filing 
of a class action lawsuit”). NLRB Memo OM 12-31 goes on to say that the Facebook discussion 
“clearly fell within the Board’s definition of concerted activity . . . .” See id. 
 110 See id. NLRB Memo OM 12-31 seems to suggest that the NLRB did not engage in any analy-
sis regarding whether the employee’s conduct should lose the protection of the NLRA. See id. The 
NLRB’s termination analysis instead only focused on the group activity standard articulated in Mey-
ers. See id.; see also Meyers Indus., Inc. (Meyers II), 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 887 (1986); Meyers Indus., 
Inc. (Meyers I), 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 497 (1984). 
 111 See Trucking Co., NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 32. 
 112 See id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. The driver was making a delivery on New Year’s Eve. Id. With no dispatcher on call for 
the holiday, his calls were forwarded to the office, which was also empty due to the holiday. See id. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
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Applying the Meyers group activity standard, the NLRB found that there 
was no evidence of concerted activity because the employee did not specifical-
ly discuss the Facebook posts with any fellow employees, nor did any of his 
coworkers respond to his online complaints.120 Due to the lack of responses, 
the NLRB reasoned that the employee was not attempting to initiate, induce, or 
prepare for group action.121 Instead, the NLRB isolated the employee’s Face-
book posts and viewed them as expressions of the employee’s individual frus-
trations.122 The NLRB concluded that the employee was simply “griping” and 
expressing irritation and boredom while stranded, activity that is not protected 
by the NLRA.123 
B. Does It Go Too Far?: Applying Loss of Protection Standards to  
Social Media Cases 
In addition to explaining the NLRB’s concerted activity analysis, NLRB 
Memo OM 12-31 also discusses cases that illustrate the NLRB’s analysis for 
how an employee might lose the protections of the NLRA.124 For example, in 
Popcorn Packaging, the NLRB found that an employee’s Facebook comments 
were concerted activity and that the employee had not engaged in conduct that 
would lose protection of the NLRA.125 There, one employee’s Facebook post 
discussed all of the “drama in the plant.”126 Another employee responded to the 
                                                                                                                           
 119 See id. at 33. The employee in Trucking Co. was not actually terminated by his employer. Id. 
After the employee posted his complaints on Facebook, the employer’s operations manager made a 
critical response to the posts. Id. at 32. Among other things, the operations manager stated that she 
heard another company was hiring. Id. at 33. The employer stripped the employee of his status as a 
leader operator and reduced his pay, citing the employee’s Facebook comments as the reason for the 
discipline. Id. The employee was ostracized by his coworkers, and quickly resigned. See id. 
 120 Id. The NLRB conceded that the employee did in fact discuss his work complaints with other 
drivers when he was unable to reach the on-call dispatcher. See id. at 32. Nevertheless, the NLRB 
determined that there was insufficient evidence to suggest that his Facebook post was any sort of 
continuation of collective concerns. See id. at 33. 
 121 See id. at 33. But cf. Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. at 887 (finding that concerted activity includes 
an individual employee seeking “to initiate or to induce or to prepare for group action, as well as indi-
vidual employees bringing truly group complaints to the attention of management”) (emphasis added). 
 122 See Trucking Co., NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 33. 
 123 Id.; see Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964). Although the 
NLRB’s reference to griping alludes to the Mushroom Transportation “mere griping” standard, NLRB 
Memo OM 12-31 does not specifically reference the case. See Mushroom Transp., 330 F.2d at 685; 
Trucking Co., NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 32. The NLRB seems to focus more on a 
perceived lack of preparation for group action, rather than a Mushroom Transportation mere griping 
analysis, in concluding that the employee did not engage in concerted activity. See Mushroom 
Transp., 330 F.2d at 685; Trucking Co., NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 33. 
 124 See Hospital, NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 26; Popcorn Packaging, NLRB 
MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 22. 
 125 See Popcorn Packaging, NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 24. 
126 Id. at 22. 
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post with multiple comments that her employer found unacceptable.127 The 
employer terminated the responding employee for her Facebook comments 
about work and the operations manager.128 
After finding that the employee had engaged in protected concerted activ-
ity, the NLRB considered whether the employee’s comments should lose pro-
tection of the NLRA.129 To determine if the concerted activity exceptions ap-
plied to the behavior in question, the NLRB looked to both the public dispar-
agement and the opprobrious conduct standards.130 The NLRB reasoned that 
the Facebook thread was distinguishable from the 1953 U.S. Supreme Court 
decision in NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, International Brotherhood of Elec-
trical Workers (“Jefferson Standard”) because that case dealt with communica-
tions that directly appealed to third parties.131 Instead, the NLRB compared the 
Facebook thread to a situation where communications were only overheard by 
third parties.132 The NLRB recognized, however, that the situation was also not 
a clean fit for the opprobrious conduct analysis outlined by the NLRB in 1979 
in Atlantic Steel Co., because Atlantic Steel focused on workplace outbursts 
that could undermine employee discipline.133 The NLRB, therefore, applied a 
“modified Atlantic Steel” analysis that considered the workplace discipline 
factors of Atlantic Steel and the public disparagement concerns of Jefferson 
Standard.134 
Applying the Atlantic Steel opprobrious conduct factors, the NLRB stated 
that the location of the conversation and the nature of the outburst weighed in 
favor of the NLRA protection’s.135 The NLRB interpreted the Atlantic Steel 
                                                                                                                           
 127 Id. at 23. Specifically, the employee stated that she “hated” the facility and that she could not 
wait to “get out of there.” Id. She also stated that the employer’s operations manager was the source 
for many of the plant’s problems. Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 See id. at 24. 
 130 NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers (Jefferson Standard), 346 U.S. 
464, 476 (1953) (establishing the loss of protection standard for public disparagement); Atl. Steel Co., 
245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816–17 (1979) (establishing the loss of protection standard for opprobrious con-
duct); Popcorn Packaging, NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 24. 
 131 Compare Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. at 476 (finding that a handbill campaign was a public 
attack disparaging employer’s services), with Popcorn Packaging, NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra 
note 3, at 24 (concluding that Facebook conversations do not directly appeal to third parties). 
 132 See Popcorn Packaging, NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 24. 
 133 Compare Atl. Steel, 245 N.L.R.B. at 816–17 (stating that an employee lost the protection of 
the NLRA because of his obscene behavior and language at work), with Popcorn Packaging, NLRB 
MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 24 (noting that an employee’s Facebook activity did not necessari-
ly undermine workplace discipline). 
 134 See Popcorn Packaging, NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 24. 
 135 Id. at 25. Recall that the four opprobrious conduct factors are the place of the discussion, its 
subject matter, the nature of the employee’s outburst, and whether the outburst was provoked by an 
unfair labor practice. See Atl. Steel, 245 N.L.R.B. at 816. The NLRB found that the outburst was not 
provoked by an unfair labor practice and suggested that this factor favored losing protection of the 
NLRA. See Popcorn Packaging, NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 25. Nevertheless, with the 
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location factor literally, stating that the employee’s Facebook comments oc-
curred at home.136 Additionally, in light of “the inherent differences between a 
Facebook discussion and a workplace outburst,” the NLRB considered the im-
pact of the employee’s post on the employer’s business and reputation and 
whether it was disparaging.137 After finding that the comment was not dispar-
aging, the NLRB concluded that the modified Atlantic Steel test indicated that 
the employee’s comments on Facebook did not lose the NLRA’s protection.138 
NLRB Memo OM 12-31 also discusses the NLRB’s decision in Hospital, 
where the NLRB found that an employee’s online activity, often intended for 
public, third-party audiences, was concerted activity and did not lose protec-
tion of the NLRA.139 In Hospital, the employee made a presentation to an as-
sembly that was investigating the hospital’s employment practices.140 The em-
ployee suggested through his presentation that the hospital CEO’s lack of lead-
ership had led to unfair labor practices, unfair firings, harassment, bullying, 
and a murder-suicide.141 He posted the text of the presentation to his Facebook 
page and as a comment to an online, local newspaper article.142 The hospital 
                                                                                                                           
other factors weighing in favor of the employee, the NLRB found that this one factor alone was not 
enough to cause the employee to lose the NLRA’s protection. See id. 
 136 See Popcorn Packaging, NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 24. 
 137 See id. Although the NLRB does not explicitly state it, it seems that this additional inquiry into 
whether the comment was disparaging is what ties in the Jefferson Standard public disparagement 
analysis to create the “modified” Atlantic Steel analysis. See Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. at 477–78 
(holding that the disparaging nature of the employees’ attack deprives them of the NLRA’s protec-
tion); Atl. Steel, 245 NLRB at 816 (listing factors to consider in determining whether an employee’s 
outburst is so opprobrious that it should lose the protection of the NLRA); Popcorn Packaging, NLRB 
MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 24. 
 138 See Popcorn Packaging, NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 25. 
 139 See Hospital, NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 26. 
 140 See id. at 27. Two years prior to the employee’s termination, a former employee of the hospi-
tal shot and killed a supervisor, critically wounded another, and committed suicide. Id. at 26–27. The 
employee in Hospital publicly criticized the hospital, often suggesting that the employer’s conduct 
had contributed to the shooting incident. See id. at 26. Although the employee made a number of 
comments across a variety of public platforms, one repeated theme was a reference to this murder-
suicide and whether the employer was to blame. See id. at 26, 27, 29. 
 141 Id. at 27. 
 142 See id. 26–27. Although the employer gave the employee’s Facebook post as its reason for 
dismissing the employee, it was only one of many public comments made by the employee. See id. 
The timeline of the employee’s public comments spanned from February 2009 to October 2010. See 
id. In February of 2009, the employee wrote a letter to the local newspaper, discussing the employer’s 
abuse of its workers. See id. at 26. In October 2009, the employee was quoted in a newspaper ad and 
contributed to the passage of a nurses’ resolution intended to stop workplace bullying in healthcare. 
See id. In March 2010, the local newspaper posted a letter online, written by the employee, which 
described more unfair labor practices at the hospital. Id. The employee also posted a comment on the 
webpage where the letter was published. Id. The employee posted another letter online on June 21, 
2010, which referenced the hospital’s corporate abuse. Id. A third letter written by the employee and 
posted on July 20, 2010 led to a conversation in the webpage’s comment section. Id. at 27. The em-
ployee wrote that the hospital’s management bullied employees and used personal information to 
attack and destroy those employees who stood up for themselves. Id. at 27. 
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terminated the employee for posting the presentation, claiming that the post 
was untrue and was intended to discredit the hospital’s management.143 
In light of these facts, the NLRB first applied the Meyers group activity 
standard, finding that the comments and statements made by the employee 
were concerted activity and therefore protected under the NLRA.144 Then, in 
determining whether the employee should lose protection of the NLRA, the 
NLRB applied the public disparagement test of Jefferson Standard, focusing 
on disparagement of the employer’s product and business policies.145 The 
NLRB emphasized the importance of distinguishing “sensitive issues” from 
disparagement.146 It concluded that the employee’s comments were general 
criticisms of the employer’s management and treatment of its workers and that 
all of the comments were in the context of ongoing labor disputes.147 Most im-
portant to the Jefferson Standard public disparagement analysis, the NLRB 
concluded that the criticisms did not negatively comment on the employer’s 
product: healthcare.148 The employee’s concerted activity, therefore, did not 
lose protection of the NLRA.149 
NLRB Memo OM 12-31 illustrates the NLRB’s rigid application of the 
Meyers group activity standard to circumstances that arise in the social media 
age.150 Despite language in Meyers II stating that concerted activity includes 
employees bringing group complaints to management, the NLRB has required 
                                                                                                                           
 143 Id. The hospital also claimed that the employee had violated conditions of his previous disci-
pline, as he had been reprimanded and suspended for two of the letters he had previously posted 
online. See id. 
 144 Id. at 28. The NLRB held that the employee’s statements were the “logical outgrowth” of 
collective concerns and that they were “made with or on the authority of other employees.” Id. 
 145 See Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. at 376; Hospital, NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 
29.  
 146 Hospital, NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 29. 
 147 See id. This contextual analysis is what appears to have led the NLRB to conclude, under 
Jefferson Standard’s public disparagement test, that the employee should not lose protection of the 
NLRA. See id. Recall that in Jefferson Standard, the employees lost protection of the NLRA because 
their handbills were not related to the actual labor dispute but instead attacked their employer’s ser-
vices. 346 U.S. at 476. 
 148 See Hospital, NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 29. To support this proposition, 
NLRB Memo OM 12-31 references language in Jefferson Standard that suggests protection could be 
lost for a “sharp, public, disparaging attack upon the quality of the company’s product and its business 
policies.” See id. (citing Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. at 471). The NLRB seems to focus on the word 
“product,” determining that the employee’s comments did not disparage the hospital’s ability to ad-
minister healthcare. See id. NLRB Memo OM12-31 did not address whether the comments were pub-
licly disparaging to the hospital’s other “business policies.” See id. 
 149 See id. 
150 See Collections Agency, NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 5 (finding that an individu-
al employee’s complaints were concerted activity due to coworkers’ supportive responses); Trucking 
Co., NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 32 (finding that an individual employee’s complaints 
were not concerted activity due to a lack of coworker response). 
2015] Social Media Protections Under the National Labor Relations Act 1235 
group interaction in social media cases.151 This rigid application has resulted in 
inconsistent consequences for employees who have engaged in similar con-
duct.152 Additionally, the NLRB’s has inconsistently applied loss of protection 
standards to employees engaging in public and potentially opprobrious con-
duct.153 A comparison of the NLRB Memo OM 12-31 cases illustrates these 
inconsistencies and calls for a more nuanced approach to concerted activity in 
social media cases.154 
III. OLD LAW PRODUCES SHAKY RESULTS FOR NEW TECHNOLOGY: A NEW 
APPROACH TO CONCERTED ACTIVITY IN THE SOCIAL MEDIA AGE 
Although the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) has developed 
case law about what constitutes concerted activity within the meaning of sec-
tion 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), the current framework 
does not fit the realities of today’s online world.155 This Part highlights the in-
consistent results produced from applying the existing framework to social 
media cases and suggests a better approach going forward.156 Section A shows 
                                                                                                                           
151 Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. at 887 (finding that concerted activity includes circumstances where 
individual employees seek to initiate group action, or bring truly group complaints to management); 
Trucking Co., NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 32 (refusing to find concerted activity when 
an employee brought a possible group complaint to management’s attention, because no coworkers 
responded to the employee’s online post). 
152 Compare Collections Agency, NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 5 (finding that an 
employee voicing individual complaints on Facebook was protected by the NLRA because she was 
engaged in concerted activity), with Trucking Co., NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 32 (find-
ing that a truck driver voicing group concerns about road conditions on Facebook was not engaged in 
concerted activity). 
153 Compare Hospital, NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 29 (applying the Jefferson 
Standard public disparagement test to an employee’s online conduct to determine whether the em-
ployee should lose the protection of the NLRA), with Popcorn Packaging, NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, 
supra note 3, at 24 (applying a modified Atlantic Steel test to an employee’s online conduct to deter-
mine whether the employee should lose the protection of the NLRA). 
154 See Ferrall, supra note 3, at 1033 (arguing that the “uniqueness” of social media requires a 
different approach from the traditional concerted activity analysis). Compare Collections Agency, 
NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 5 (finding that an individual employee’s complaints were 
concerted activity due to their coworkers’ supportive responses), with Trucking Co., NLRB MEMO 
OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 32 (finding that an individual employee’s complaints were not concerted 
activity due to the lack of coworker responses); Hospital, NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 
29 (applying the Jefferson Standard public disparagement test to an employee’s online conduct to 
determine whether the employee should lose the protection of the NLRA), with Popcorn Packaging, 
NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 24 (applying a modified Atlantic Steel test to an employee’s 
online conduct to determine whether the employee should lose the protection of the NLRA). 
155 See NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 26, 32; Ferrall, supra note 3, at 1026 (arguing 
that the NLRB’s adherence to outdated precedent has created problems in applying the concerted 
activity standard to social media contexts); Green, supra note 8, at 867 (stating that judges have strug-
gled applying old law to social media cases); Neal, supra note 34, at 1752 (arguing that social media 
cases do not fit within the current concerted activity standard). 
156 See infra notes 160–240 and accompanying text. 
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how applying the Meyers group activity standard to social media cases has led 
to inconsistent protection under the NLRA for employee’s engaging in similar 
conduct.157 Section B then explains how the NLRB has inconsistently applied 
preexisting law for when concerted activity loses protection of the NLRA.158 
Finally, Section C proposes solutions for both the concerted activity standard 
and the loss of protection standard that effectively account for the realities of 
the social media age.159 
A. Same Posts, Different Outcomes: Inconsistency in  
Finding Concerted Activity 
By applying a narrow interpretation of the Meyers group activity stand-
ard, and ignoring the inherently paradoxical nature of social media, the NLRB 
has been unable to strike the right balance in evaluating whether a particular 
activity on social media constitutes concerted activity.160 The characteristics of 
social media that distinguish online communication from workplace communi-
cation also create difficulty in applying the preexisting concerted activity 
standard to new technology.161 As articulated by the courts and the NLRB in 
the Meyers cases, concerted activity requires comments that seek to “initiate or 
to induce or to prepare for group action.”162 In contrast, comments that are not 
made in preparation for group action, or those that amount to “mere griping,” 
are not concerted.163 
This divide poses problems in the social media context, where almost any 
communication can be viewed, commented on, or ignored by any number of 
friends and coworkers.164 Thus, on one hand, any social media post could be 
                                                                                                                           
 157 See infra notes 160–184 and accompanying text. 
 158 See infra notes 185–206 and accompanying text. 
159 See infra notes 207–240 and accompanying text. 
 160 See NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 3, 32; Ferrall, supra note 3, at 1026 (arguing 
that the concerted activity standard does not fit the social media context); Green, supra note 8, at 867 
(stating that judges have struggled applying old law to social media cases); Neal, supra note 34, at 
1752 (arguing that the concerted activity standard does not fit in cases involving social media). 
 161 See NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 4, 32 (finding concerted activity in Collections 
Agency because coworkers supportively responded to the employee’s Facebook post, but not in Truck-
ing Co. when no coworkers responded to the truck driver’s post); Neal, supra note 34, at 1751–52 
(explaining that determining concerted activity on social media is difficult because all online posts 
involve a speaker and listeners). 
 162 See Meyers Indus., Inc. (Meyers II), 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 887 (1986). 
 163 See Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964); Meyers II, 281 
N.L.R.B. at 887; Neal, supra note 34, at 1750 (arguing that “‘mere griping’ is the antithesis of con-
certed activity”). 
 164 See Neal, supra note 34, at 1751–52. In 2014, over half of all adult Facebook users had more 
than 200 friends, and thirty-five percent had over 250. Aaron Smith, 6 New Facts About Facebook, 
PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Feb. 3, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/02/03/6-new-facts-
about-facebook/, archived at http://perma.cc/3Q8F-ZFTG. Twenty-seven percent of users under the 
age of thirty have more than 500 friends. Id. 
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seen as an attempt to prepare for group action, because the comment is posted 
in an inherently social and public forum.165 On the other hand, social media 
pages can be used as a vehicle for expressing personal and professional frustra-
tion.166 In that regard, an employer could argue that anything posted on a social 
networking page constitutes “mere griping.”167 Social media is a difficult para-
dox for the concerted activity standard, since a website like Facebook both 
promotes concerted activity and can serve as a platform for personal com-
plaints.168 
In light of this paradox, the NLRB has applied a narrow interpretation of 
the Meyers group activity standard to the social media context.169 The NLRB 
has essentially found that the fact that a comment is posted online does not 
affect the concerted activity analysis.170 Rather, the NLRB only finds concert-
ed activity when a social media post clearly initiates or induces group ac-
tion.171 As to when a social media post initiates or induces group action, the 
NLRB has taken a reactive approach, focusing on coworkers’ responses to the 
original post.172 
The NLRB’s consideration of online comments in recent social media 
cases demonstrates this reactive approach.173 In Collections Agency, where the 
                                                                                                                           
 165 See Neal, supra note 34, at 1751. 
 166 See id. at 1752 (stating that social media is platform for airing personal and work-related com-
plaints and gripes). The most commonly cited complaint among Facebook users is other users sharing 
too much information about themselves, or “oversharing.” Smith, supra note 164. 
 167 See Neal, supra note 34, at 1751. 
 168 See id. at 1751–52. 
 169 See NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 4, 32 (finding concerted activity in Collections 
Agency because coworkers supportively responded to the employee’s Facebook post, but not in Truck-
ing Co. when no coworkers responded to the employee’s post). 
 170 See Ferrall, supra note 3, at 1026 (arguing that the NLRB is “misguided when it broadly as-
serts that communication over the Internet does nothing to alter a finding of protected activity”); see 
also OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., OM 11-74, REPORT OF THE ACT-
ING GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES 4 (Aug. 18, 2011), available at http://
apps.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458056e743, archived at http://perma.cc/7XKM-YDCY 
(using Facebook communication as a model example of concerted activity “even though it transpired 
on a social network platform”). 
 171 See NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 4, 32 (finding concerted activity in Collections 
Agency because coworkers supportively responded to the employee’s Facebook post, but not in Truck-
ing Co. when no coworkers responded to the employee’s post). 
 172 See Green, supra note 8, at 867 (arguing that the NLRB has relied too heavily on the actual 
responses from Facebook friends when determining whether online activity is concerted); see also 
Neal, supra note 34, at 1749–50 (arguing that the “root of the difficulty” in social media cases is de-
termining when individual activity becomes concerted activity). Compare Collections Agency, NLRB 
MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 4 (finding that there was concerted activity when coworkers re-
sponded to the employee’s post with support and suggested legal action), with Trucking Co., NLRB 
MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 32 (refusing to find concerted activity when an employee posted 
complaints on Facebook and no coworkers responded). 
 173 See NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 4, 32 (finding concerted activity only in cases 
where coworkers responded to the employee’s original social media complaint). 
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employee’s transfer was an effective demotion, the employee posted a series of 
individual complaints, saying that her employer “messed up and that she was 
done with being a good employee.”174 Later posts by coworkers voiced support 
for the employee’s complaints and one even suggested filing a lawsuit.175 In 
contrast, in Trucking Co., although the employee posted that roads were 
closed, no dispatcher had answered his calls, and that it would be his employ-
er’s fault if any of the drivers were late, none of his coworkers responded.176 
Although the communications by the respective employees are similar, 
the NLRB found concerted activity in Collections Agency, but not in Trucking 
Co.177 One reason for this difference was the NLRB’s focus on the unpredicta-
ble responses of the employees’ coworkers.178 In Collections Agency, multiple 
coworkers commented on the employee’s post, lending supportive words, and 
even suggesting a class action lawsuit.179 According to the NLRB, these 
coworker responses turned the employee’s individual concerns into group ac-
tivity that warranted protection under the NLRA.180 Alternatively, the NLRB 
found there was no concerted activity in Trucking Co. simply because no one 
responded to the employee’s post.181 
Comparing these two cases, this distinction seems arbitrary, as there are a 
number of reasons why coworkers might or might not comment on another 
employee’s post.182 Unpredictable online responses should not turn “mere grip-
                                                                                                                           
 174 See Collections Agency, NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 3; see also Mushroom 
Transp., 330 F.2d at 685 (finding that “mere griping” that did not attempt to actually improve the 
relevant conditions of employment was not concerted activity). 
 175 See Collections Agency, NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 4 (recounting various sup-
portive messages of coworkers online, one of whom suggested class action). 
 176 Trucking Co., NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 32. The employee also commented 
that the employer was running off hard-working drivers. Id. 
 177 Compare Collections Agency, NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 4 (finding concerted 
activity), with Trucking Co., NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 32 (refusing to find concerted 
activity). In comparison, the employee in Collections Agency arguably voiced a more individual con-
cern, complaining about an individual demotion and a personal lack of motivation to work hard. See 
Collections Agency, NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 3. In contrast, in Trucking Co., the 
employee posted information and complaints that could have been useful for other company drivers 
whose deliveries were delayed by snow. See Trucking Co., NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 
32. 
 178 See Collections Agency, NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 4 (finding concerted activi-
ty when coworkers responded to a Facebook post that originally expressed an individual complaint). 
 179 See id. The NLRB found the post suggesting a class action suit especially compelling to the 
concerted activity analysis. See id. 
 180 See id. at 5. 
 181 Compare id. at 3 (posting that her employer had made a mistake by demoting her and that she 
was done being good employee), with Trucking Co., NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 32 
(posting that roads were closed and that if any drivers were late it would be company’s fault). 
 182 See Green, supra note 8, at 867–68 (suggesting that online responses depend mostly on unpre-
dictable factors). For example, in Trucking Co., instead of assuming that the Facebook post was not a 
group concern, one might attribute the lack of responses to the fact that the employee posted the 
comments on New Year’s Eve. See Trucking Co., NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 32; 
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ing” into concerted activity; nor should online silence turn a possible group 
complaint into “mere griping.”183 The two cases demonstrate how fortuitous a 
finding of concerted activity can be and highlights the importance of striking a 
different balance.184 
B. Losing Protection for Otherwise Concerted Activity: Inconsistencies in 
Deciding When Conduct Should Lose the NLRA’s Protection 
The NLRB’s analysis for deciding when an employee loses the protection 
of the NLRA has also led to unpredictable results in the social media con-
text.185 In 1953, in NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, International Brotherhood 
of Electrical Workers (“Jefferson Standard”), the U.S. Supreme Court estab-
lished an exception to the concerted activity analysis on the basis of the duty of 
loyalty in the employment context.186 Specifically, the Supreme Court held that 
employee conduct can be separable and that activities unrelated to a labor dis-
pute, especially public disparagement, might fall outside the protection of the 
NLRA.187 The NLRB established another exception in 1979 in Atlantic Steel 
Co., finding that an employee could lose protection of the NLRA if their be-
havior was opprobrious.188  
                                                                                                                           
Green, supra note 8, at 867–68. It is also possible that the manager’s critical response could have 
dissuaded other coworkers from responding. See Trucking Co., NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 
3, at 32; Green, supra note 8, at 867–68. 
 183 See Green, supra note 8, at 867–68 (“Whether or not colleagues reply to Facebook threads 
may depend mostly on the time of the posting or other matters that seem too dependent on contingen-
cy . . . .”); see also Ferrall, supra note 3, at 1033 (arguing that identities of online responders should 
not be key factor for determining concerted activity). 
184 Compare Collections Agency, NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 4 (finding concerted 
activity when coworkers responded to the employee’s post), with Trucking Co., NLRB MEMO OM 12-
31, supra note 3, at 32 (refusing to find concerted activity when an employee posted his New Year’s 
Eve complaints on Facebook and no coworkers responded). 
 185 Compare Hospital, NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 26 (employing a traditional 
Jefferson Standard public disparagement analysis without considering Atlantic Steel opprobrious 
conduct factors), with Popcorn Packaging, NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 24 (applying a 
“modified Atlantic Steel analysis” to an employee’s Facebook activity). 
 186 See NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers (Jefferson Standard), 346 
U.S. 464, 473 (1953). The court held that a labor dispute did not eliminate the loyalties of the em-
ployment relationship. See id. 
 187 See id. at 476–77. The Court held that the employee’s disparaging handbill campaign, which 
attacked the quality of the employer’s broadcasting product, was separable from the underlying labor 
dispute. See id. at 476. Thus, despite the employee’s other concerted activities, they lost the NLRA’s 
protection. See id. at 477–78. 
 188 See Atl. Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816 (1979). Recall that the factors the NLRB uses to 
determine whether conduct is opprobrious are: (1) the place of the discussion; (2) the subject matter of 
the discussion; (3) the nature of the outburst; and (4) whether the outburst was provoked by an unfair 
labor practice. Id. 
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The inherent characteristics of social media create difficulty in neatly ap-
plying these “loss of protection” standards.189 Prior to social media, under Jef-
ferson Standard, the NLRB could determine when an employee had engaged 
in separable public disparagement by examining whether the employee had 
communicated with the public about matters unrelated to the employment dis-
pute.190 Today, when an employee posts on social media, it is not always clear 
whether he or she means to communicate with anyone in particular, their 
whole network, or no one at all.191 
Social media can also complicate the Atlantic Steel opprobrious conduct 
analysis, especially with respect to the location factor.192 The NLRB has 
counted this factor in favor of employees, finding that online communications 
occur at home, and thus are less likely to disrupt the workplace.193 It is not en-
tirely clear, however, whether an employee’s comment on social media takes 
place at home, or if by posting online, the employee is actually communicating 
everywhere.194 Confusion over the communication’s location has proven diffi-
cult for the NLRB, which has attempted to categorize social media cases as 
either Jefferson Standard public disparagement cases or Atlantic Steel oppro-
brious conduct cases.195 
                                                                                                                           
 189 See NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 24, 29; see also Neal, supra note 34, at 1751–52 
(arguing that social media presents difficulties for concerted activity analysis because it is inherently 
social, but also is also used as a platform for personal griping). 
 190 See Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. at 476. The Court upheld the NLRB’s finding that the dis-
paragement of the employer’s product might have been justified if was communicated in a “conven-
tional appeal” for union support. See id. at 477. The fact that the communication was a separable at-
tack on the employer’s product that was communicated to the public changed the Court’s analysis and 
ultimately pushed the conduct outside the purview of the NLRA’s protection. See id. 
 191 See Ferrall, supra note 3, at 1027 (arguing that the “omnipresent public audience” of a social 
media post creates difficulty in applying the concerted activity and loss of protection standards to 
social media cases). Compare Collections Agency, NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 3 (de-
scribing an employee’s individual work concerns which generated coworker response), with Trucking 
Co., NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 32 (describing an employee’s potentially group con-
cerns which did not generate any responses from coworkers). 
 192 See Ferrall, supra note 3, at 1033 (arguing that the NLRB’s treatment of the location factor 
does not reflect differences between social media posts and traditional work communication). 
193 See Popcorn Packaging, NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 25 (finding that Facebook 
discussion occurred at home and thus was not disruptive of workplace discipline). 
 194 See Ferrall, supra note 3, at 1033; see also Mark A. Cloutier, Note, Opening the Schoolhouse 
Gate: Why the Supreme Court Should Adopt the Standard Announced in Tatro v. University of Min-
nesota to Permit the Regulation of Certain Non-Curricular Student Speech in Professional Programs, 
55 B.C. L. REV. 1659, 1666 (2014) (explaining difficulty in determining “where” online speech oc-
curs). 
 195 See NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 29 (categorizing loss of protection analysis as 
analogous to either Atlantic Steel or Jefferson Standard). One could see how, prior to social media, the 
NLRB could more easily decide whether to apply Jefferson Standard or Atlantic Steel. See Jefferson 
Standard, 346 U.S. at 468, 476 (concerning distributed handbills to the public denouncing the em-
ployer during a strike); Atl. Steel, 245 N.L.R.B. at 814 (concerning an employee’s outburst during a 
work shift). The Jefferson Standard analysis would not apply to a workplace outburst, any more than 
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The NLRB has inconsistently applied the two standards to deal with the 
problems presented by social media.196 Although the “modified Atlantic Steel” 
test is not explicitly articulated, Popcorn Packaging represents an effort by the 
NLRB to adapt its older standards to the social media context.197 Acknowledg-
ing the “inherent differences between a Facebook discussion and a workplace 
outburst,” the NLRB also considered the impact that the employee’s public 
comments could have on the employer’s business.198 Nevertheless, applying 
the “modified” test, the NLRB found that the employee’s mild comments did 
not lose protection of the NLRA.199 
Despite Popcorn Packaging’s use of the modified Atlantic Steel test, in 
Hospital, the NLRB chose to employ a traditional Jefferson Standard public 
disparagement analysis.200 The NLRB focused entirely on the “disparagement” 
aspect of Jefferson Standard and found that, although the employee raised 
“sensitive issues,” he did not disparage the employer.201 The NLRB did not 
acknowledge the impact these sensitive posts could have on the employer’s 
business once the public viewed them.202 To ignore the public aspect of the 
communications is to selectively apply Jefferson Standard, which focused on 
“disparagement,” but did so in the context of a separable, public attack.203 The 
NLRB’s selective application of Jefferson Standard, disregarding the public 
                                                                                                                           
the Atlantic Steel analysis would apply to an appeal to the public. See Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. at 
468; Atl. Steel 245, N.L.R.B. at 814. 
 196 See NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 24, 29 (employing a “modified Atlantic Steel” 
analysis in Popcorn Packaging, but a traditional Jefferson Standard analysis in Hospital). 
 197 See Popcorn Packaging, NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 24. Recall that the modi-
fied analysis incorporated the Atlantic Steel opprobrious conduct factors, but borrowed from Jefferson 
Standard by analyzing the employee’s alleged disparagement of the employer’s products or services. 
See supra notes 129–134 and accompanying text (explaining the modified Atlantic Steel standard used 
in Popcorn Packaging). Nevertheless, it is not clear how much the NLRB “borrows” from Jefferson 
Standard, since the NLRB seemed to ignore the “separable” conduct aspect of the exception. See 
Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. at 477 (holding that a concerted separable attack on the employer’s ser-
vices did not receive protection under the NLRA); Popcorn Packaging, NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, 
supra note 3, at 24–25. 
 198 See Popcorn Packaging, NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 25. 
 199 See id. 
 200 See Hospital, NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 29. 
 201 See id. In Hospital, the employee was terminated for repeatedly posting letters, presentations, 
and comments online, stating that the employer routinely engaged in unfair labor practices and con-
tributed to a murder-suicide. See id. at 26–27. 
 202 See id. at 29. The “sensitive issues” were the employee’s repeated insinuations that manage-
ment’s leadership was to blame for a murder-suicide at the hospital. See id. at 26. 
 203 See Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. at 476–77. The NLRB focused on whether the employee’s 
criticisms disparaged the hospital’s product, which was defined as providing healthcare. See Hospital, 
NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 29. It made no reference to how repeated public mention of 
a murder-suicide could affect the hospital’s general reputation. See id. 
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and separable nature of a social media post, deviates from the “modified Atlan-
tic Steel” standard adopted in Popcorn Packaging.204 
Hospital and Popcorn Packaging demonstrate the NLRB’s inconsistency 
in determining whether employee conduct should lose the protection of the 
NLRA.205 Altogether, the NLRB’s narrow interpretation of the Meyers group 
activity requirement, as well as its inconsistency in determining when conduct 
should lose the NLRA’s protection, has created results in concerted activity 
cases that do not reflect the characteristics of today’s online world.206 
C. Social Media Standards We Can “Like”: Proposals for a More Current 
and Effective Approach in Finding Concerted Activity 
To better reflect the reality of today’s online world, the NLRB should 
make changes to both the concerted activity standard and the loss of protection 
standard for employee activity on social media sites.207 Subsection 1 first ar-
gues that the NLRB should consider employee intent when deciding whether 
an online post should be considered concerted activity.208 Subsection 2 then 
suggests a more clearly articulated “modified Atlantic Steel” test that the 
NLRB should adopt consistently when evaluating whether an employee’s con-
duct should lose the protection of the NLRA.209 
                                                                                                                           
 204 See Hospital, NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 29 (choosing not to use the modified 
Atlantic Steel standard, instead focusing on the disparagement portion of the Jefferson Standard anal-
ysis, without considering the public nature of the online communications or the possibility that these 
communications could be separable from the labor dispute); Popcorn Packaging, NLRB MEMO OM 
12-31, supra note 3, at 24 (using a modified Atlantic Steel test for loss of protection analysis). 
 205 Compare Hospital, NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 29 (choosing not to use the 
modified Atlantic Steel standard), with Popcorn Packaging, NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 
24 (using a modified Atlantic Steel test for loss of protection analysis). Although this Note seeks to 
only illustrate the NLRB’s inconsistent approach in the social media context, it is also worth question-
ing what exactly an employee must do to lose the protection of the NLRA. See generally NLRB 
MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3 (explaining cases that the NLRB considered to lose the protection of 
the NLRA). It is difficult to determine today, as there are no cases detailed in NLRB Memo OM 12-
31 where an employee loses the protection of the NLRA. See generally id. (explaining multiple cases 
in which the NLRB considered whether an employee should lose protection of the NLRA, but never 
noting an instance where protection was actually lost). 
206 Compare Collections Agency, NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 4 (finding concerted 
activity when coworkers responded to the employee’s post), with Trucking Co., NLRB MEMO OM 12-
31, supra note 3, at 32 (refusing to find concerted activity when an employee posted complaints on 
New Year’s Eve on Facebook and no coworkers responded); Hospital, NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, 
supra note 3, at 26 (employing a traditional Jefferson Standard public disparagement analysis without 
considering Atlantic Steel’s opprobrious conduct factors), with Popcorn Packaging, NLRB MEMO 
OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 24 (employing a “modified Atlantic Steel analysis” for an employee’s 
Facebook activity). 
207 See Ferrall, supra note 3, at 1033 (arguing that the “uniqueness” of social media requires the 
NLRB to adopt a specific approach for dealing with social media cases). 
208 See infra notes 210–222 and accompanying text. 
209 See infra notes 223–240 and accompanying text. 
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1. Employee Intent Should Weigh More Than Coworker Responses When 
Deciding Concerted Activity 
 The NLRB should reconsider the way it has applied the Meyers group 
activity standard to social media cases by focusing on whether the social media 
poster intended to induce, initiate, or prepare for group action.210 The NLRB’s 
current approach of focusing on the unpredictable responses of coworker 
friends does not comport with the purpose of section 7 of the NLRA, which is 
to allow employees to informally band together for their mutual aid and pro-
tection.211 By analyzing concerted activity based simply on coworker respons-
es, the NLRB has found group activity where an employee’s original post may 
have otherwise been considered to be “mere griping.”212 Likewise, a Facebook 
post which raised a genuine group concern was labeled an expression of 
“boredom” simply because no coworker responded.213 
If a social media post can simultaneously speak to everyone or no one at 
all, the NLRB should, on a case-by-case basis, try to ascertain the employee’s 
intent behind the post.214 The key inquiry ought to be whether the employee’s 
social media post intended to reach coworkers and possibly prepare for group 
action.215 The arbitrary responses, or even silence, of coworkers should only be 
considered in the particular circumstances of each case.216 An employee who 
                                                                                                                           
 210 See Ferrall, supra note 3, at 1033 (arguing that the NLRB “should focus more closely on the 
employee’s intent when he posts an online statement”); Green, supra note 8, at 867–68 (arguing that 
the intent of the speaker should outweigh coworker responses in concerted activity analysis). 
 211 See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012); see also Ferrall, supra note 3, at 1033 (arguing that employee 
intent should be the most important factor for determining whether an action should be considered a 
concerted activity); Green, supra note 8, at 867–68 (arguing that coworker responses are too unpre-
dictable and that the NLRB should instead focus on the intent of the speaker for finding concerted 
activity). 
 212 See Collections Agency, NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 3–4 (involving an em-
ployment dispute where the employee’s original Facebook post resembled an individual complaint, 
but became concerted activity when coworkers responded and suggested legal action). 
 213 See Trucking Co., NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 33 (involving an employment 
dispute where the employee posted that all roads were closed, no dispatchers were answering calls, 
and that if drivers were late it would not be their fault). 
 214 See Ferrall, supra note 3, at 1033; Green, supra note 8, at 867–68. After all, in the 1984 deci-
sion Meyers Industries, Inc. (Meyers I), the NLRB emphasized that “concerted activity is, at its heart, 
a factual once, the fate of a particular case rising or falling on the record evidence.” See 268 N.L.R.B. 
493, 497 (1984). 
 215 See Ferrall, supra note 3, at 1033 (arguing that the NLRB should focus on employee intent 
when determining whether an online post is concerted activity); Green, supra note 8, at 867–68 (argu-
ing that the NLRB should focus on employee intent for its concerted activity analysis). 
 216 See Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. at 497 (stating that the question of concerted activity is inherently 
factual, with “the fate of a particular case rising or falling on the record evidence”); see also Ferrall, 
supra note 3, at 1033 (arguing that intent of employee is more indicative of concerted activity than 
coworkers reactions); Green, supra note 8, at 867–68 (arguing that coworker responses are too de-
pendent on circumstances to be the focus of a proper concerted activity analysis). 
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intended to initiate or prepare for group action should be protected, consistent 
with the purposes of the NLRA, even if no coworkers respond.217  
The Meyers group activity standard, however, is not altogether improper 
for the social media context.218 Instead, the NLRB should just interpret the 
Meyers group activity standard more broadly to cover all situations in which 
an employee might have sought “to initiate or to induce or to prepare for group 
action.”219 By looking at the employee’s intent, the NLRB could find instances 
where an employee has prepared for group action without necessarily inducing 
it or initiating it right then and there online.220 This interpretation affords 
broader protections to employees by finding concerted activity not only in in-
stances where a comment actually induces a group response like in Collections 
Agency, but also in cases where a post containing a group concern goes unno-
ticed or unanswered.221 Focusing on employee intent would allow the NLRB 
                                                                                                                           
 217 See Ferrall, supra note 3, at 1033 (arguing that employee intent should be focus in deciding 
whether social media post is concerted activity); Green, supra note 8, at 867–68 (arguing that employ-
ee intent is more important than coworker responses for determining concerted activity). But cf. 
Trucking Co., NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 32 (finding no concerted activity when a 
truck driver’s potentially group concerns did not generate response from coworkers). Such an interpre-
tation could likely afford protection to a situation like Trucking Co., where an employee might raise a 
genuine group concern that goes unnoticed, or is not responded to, on Facebook. See Trucking Co., 
NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 32. 
 218 See Neal, supra note 34, at 1757 (arguing that the NLRB can continue to use the Meyers group 
activity standard for social media cases). But see Ferrall, supra note 3, at 1032 (arguing that since 
“Meyers does not address the distinct nature of employees’ social media communication, the [NLRB] 
should not rely on it in determining whether the activity is protected concerted activity under the 
NLRA”). 
 219 See Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. at 887. 
 220 See Trucking Co., NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 32; Ferrall, supra note 3, at 1033. 
The distinction is a small one, but the NLRB’s current focus on coworker responses seems to suggest 
that it looks only to whether a social media post “initiates” or “induces” group action, while the lan-
guage from Meyers II also protects an employee who “prepares” for group action. See Meyers II, 281 
N.L.R.B. at 887 (finding that concerted activity includes “those circumstances where individual em-
ployees seek to initiate or to induce or to prepare for group action”) (emphasis added); NLRB MEMO 
OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 3, 32 (finding concerted activity where an employee initiates a group 
response, but not where an employee’s preparations for group action fail to initiate a group response). 
The NLRB’s focus on coworker reactions does not account for the possibility that an employee’s post 
could be intended to prepare for group action. See Trucking Co., NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 
3, at 32 (finding that an employee’s Facebook posts did not induce or initiate group action and thus 
were not concerted activity). 
 221 See NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 3, 32. Moreover, by shifting its focus to em-
ployee intent, the NLRB can more effectively protect employees under the Meyers group activity 
standard, which also accounts for individual employees bringing group complaints to the attention of 
management. See Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. at 887 (finding that concerted activity includes an individ-
ual employee seeking to “initiate or to induce or to prepare for group action, as well as individual 
employees bringing truly group complaints to the attention of management”) (emphasis added). 
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to more effectively apply the Meyers group activity test to social media cas-
es.222  
2. Needing a More Clearly Defined “Modified Atlantic Steel” Test 
 If the NLRB is to employ a broader interpretation for concerted activities 
in the social media context, it should also consider the public nature of online 
communications in determining whether employee conduct should lose the 
protection of the NLRA.223 Specifically, the NLRB should adopt a more clear-
ly defined modified Atlantic Steel test for all social media cases.224 The 
NLRB’s attempt to categorize social media cases as either Jefferson Standard 
public disparagement cases or Atlantic Steel opprobrious conduct cases does 
not acknowledge the inherent differences between a social media conversation 
and a workplace conversation.225 By applying a modified Atlantic Steel test, 
the NLRB can analyze whether an employee’s conduct was so opprobrious as 
to lose protection of the NLRA while considering the public element to each 
and every social media post.226 Such a modified test recognizes the inherent 
difficulty in categorizing social media cases as either Atlantic Steel or Jeffer-
son Standard cases.227 
 Furthermore, the NLRB should tweak its modified Atlantic Steel test to 
better account for the public impact of statements made on social media.228 To 
start, the NLRB should articulate that Jefferson Standard’s contribution to the 
modified test is the consideration that social media posts are inherently public 
and that these public posts can hurt an employer’s business or reputation.229 In 
                                                                                                                           
222 See Ferrall, supra note 3, at 1033 (arguing that the “uniqueness” of social media requires a 
concerted activity approach that focuses on employee intent). 
 223 See id. at 1027; Neal, supra note 34, at 1757. This Note acknowledges that by focusing on 
both employee intent and coworker responses, the likelihood of finding concerted activity increases 
dramatically. See Neal, supra note 34, at 1757 (suggesting that the broader group activity standard, 
without a strict loss of protection standard, could overprotect employee activity). A clearer standard 
for losing protection of the NLRA, however, can counteract this effect. See id. (arguing that “[i]f the 
Board construes the Meyers I standard broadly . . . it may be appropriate . . . to apply a more stringent 
loss-of-protection standard subsequently” to promote the policies of the NLRA). 
 224 See Popcorn Packaging, NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 24. 
 225 See id. at 25; Neal, supra note 34, at 1751–52. 
 226 See Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. at 477 (finding that employees can lose protection under the 
NLRA through separable public disparagement of employer); Atl. Steel, 245 N.L.R.B. at 816 (finding 
that employees can lose protection of the NLRA through opprobrious conduct). 
 227 See NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 24 (explaining the need for a modified loss of 
protection standard in light of the difficulty of categorizing social media cases as either Atlantic Steel 
or Jefferson Standard cases). 
 228 See id. (stating that the modified test considers a Jefferson Standard disparagement analysis); 
Neal, supra note 34, at 1751–52 (arguing that the public nature of social media requires a modified 
analysis). 
 229 See NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 24. The NLRB treads carefully around this by 
distinguishing appealing to the public from being “overheard” by the public. See id. The distinction is 
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that vein, when balancing the factors of the Atlantic Steel opprobrious conduct 
analysis for social media cases, the first factor—location—should always 
weigh toward losing protection of the NLRA.230 When applying the opprobri-
ous conduct analysis, the NLRB has found that social media posts occur at 
home, counting that factor in employees’ favor for the NLRA’s protection.231 
The NLRB has reasoned that since the social media posts occur at home, there 
is little chance that the communications will disrupt workplace discipline.232 
This interpretation does not account for the fact that social media posts that 
“occur” at home can be viewed by anyone, anywhere.233 The public nature of 
these posts suggests the location factor should weigh in favor of the employer 
and loss of protection.234 
Finally, the NLRB should include more of the Jefferson Standard public 
disparagement analysis in its modified test—specifically, that employee con-
duct can be separable.235 There are employee actions that relate to an employ-
ment dispute and actions that are unrelated to any dispute.236 By ignoring the 
separability aspect of the Jefferson Standard analysis, the NLRB has allowed 
employees to post just about anything online, so long as there is a labor dispute 
in the background.237 Jefferson Standard explicitly cautioned against such al-
                                                                                                                           
semantic, and the NLRB should acknowledge the possibility of public disparagement any time a 
comment is made on a social media site. See Ferrall, supra note 3, at 1027. 
 230 See Ferrall, supra note 3, at 1030 (arguing that when third parties can view an employee’s 
online discussion, the location factor should favor the employer and loss of protection of the NLRA). 
But see NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 25 (stating that since an online discussion took 
place “at home,” the location factor favored the employee). 
 231 See Popcorn Packaging, NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 25 (finding that an em-
ployee’s Facebook post occurred at home, counting that factor in favor of employee).  
232 See id. According to the NLRB, “home” communications are less likely to disrupt workplace 
discipline and are therefore less likely to be considered so opprobrious as to lose the protection of the 
NLRA. See Atl. Steel, 245 N.L.R.B. at 816–17. 
 233 See Ferrall, supra note 3, at 1027–28 (arguing that social media’s “omnipresent public audi-
ence” makes online posts different from traditional workplace comments); see also Cloutier, supra 
note 194, at 1666 (explaining the difficulty in determining “where” online speech occurs). 
 234 See Ferrall, supra note 3, at 1030 (arguing that the location factor in Atlantic Steel’s loss of 
protection standard should always favor employers in social media cases). 
 235 See Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. at 477 (establishing a loss of protection standard for public 
disparagement of employer’s goods or services and emphasizing that an employees’ actions may be 
separable from an ongoing labor dispute). 
 236 See id. at 476. 
 237 See Hospital, NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 26–27. In Hospital, an employee in a 
long-term labor dispute repeatedly insinuated that his employer’s lack of leadership was responsible 
for a murder-suicide at the hospital. See id. at 26. The NLRB seemed to focus on whether or not these 
allegations amounted to defamation. See id. at 29. It concluded that the employee’s remarks were not 
disparaging because they did not insult the hospital’s product, namely healthcare. Id. The NLRB could 
have instead considered the impact these public remarks could have on the hospital’s reputation in the 
community. See id.; Ferrall, supra note 3, at 1030. Such public remarks, although perhaps not rising to 
the level of defamation, could still be considered disparaging when viewed in their public context. See 
Hospital, NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 29; Ferrall, supra note 3, at 1030 (arguing that 
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lowances, stating that “[t]he fortuity of the coexistence of a labor dispute af-
fords [employees] no substantial defense.”238 Employees who make disparag-
ing remarks that are separable and unrelated to any labor dispute should not be 
afforded the protection of the NLRA.239 By employing a modified test that 
draws on both Jefferson Standard and Atlantic Steel, the NLRB can more con-
sistently and more fairly determine when an employee’s concerted activity 
should lose the protection of the NLRA.240 
CONCLUSION 
Social media sites like Facebook and Twitter have changed the way em-
ployees communicate. Break room conversations about conditions of employ-
ment have been supplanted by angry online posts and heated comment threads. 
The NLRB has been slow in adjusting to this change, applying decades-old 
law to new technology that simply does not resemble the type of networking 
and communication envisioned by the NLRA. By broadening the concerted 
activity standard to include online communications that intend to initiate group 
action, the NLRB can account for today’s employees seeking to avail them-
selves of the NLRA’s protection. By moving away from a reactive approach, 
the NLRB can achieve more consistent results that better advance the policies 
of the NLRA. 
A broader interpretation of concerted activity, however, calls for a stricter 
and more consistent loss of protection standard. The NLRB could achieve this 
balance by adopting the modified Atlantic Steel test. This test accounts for the 
inherently public nature of social media and the reality that employee’s online 
communications have real implications for business’s reputations. In the age of 
“likes” and “tweets,” the #NLRB must adapt to our new online reality. 
JAMES LONG
                                                                                                                           
employees who publically disparage their employers on social media should be treated like Jefferson 
Standard employees and lose protection under the NLRA). 
 238 See Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. at 476. 
 239 See id. at 477. 
 240 See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012) (granting employees the right to engage in concerted activities for 
their mutual aid or protection); NLRB MEMO OM 12-31, supra note 3, at 24, 29 (applying a modified 
Atlantic Steel test to some social media cases but not others); Ferrall, supra note 3, at 1029 (arguing 
that the NLRB has misapplied both the Atlantic Steel and Jefferson Standard loss of protection stand-
ards). 
  
 
